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The effect of EU derogation strategies on the complying costs 
of the nitrate directive 
Van der Straeten, B.; Buysse, J., Nolte, S., Lauwers, L., Claeys, D. and Van Huylenbroeck G. 
 
Abstract 
Within the framework of the nitrate directive, member states have the possibility to apply for 
derogation, i.e. increasing fertilization standards under certain conditions. Several EU regions 
have made use of this possibility but all in a different way. In 2009, 6 different derogation 
policies were worked out. This paper focuses on the differences between the applied policies 
and makes an assessment of the impact of these differences on the application rate of 
derogation, the manure surplus and the costs to allocate the manure. Based on the MP-MAS 
model described by Van der Straeten et al. (2010) the different scenarios are applied on a single 
case area (Flanders) and the economic effects have been simulated. Results show large 
differences between the policy alternatives, leading to the conclusion that member states not 
only have to focus on the permission to allow derogation or not but also at the details of the 
derogation policy. Granting derogation at parcel level instead of farm level increases the 
potential effect of derogation, the height of the increase in fertilization standards under 
derogation determines the application rate of derogation: a higher increase leads to a higher 
application rate. 
 
Keywords: Nitrate directive, MAS-model, derogation, Flanders  
 
JEL classification: Q12, Q18, Q51, Q52.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
Nitrate leaching into the ground and surface water is since decennia a major problem in 
many EU member states. Fertilizer use for crop production is believed to be the major source of 
nitrate leaching (Fuller et al., 2010). The European nitrate directive (91/676/EC) focuses on this 
problem by aiming to reduce water pollution caused or induced by nitrates from all agricultural 
sources. The Nitrate directive exists already 20 years, but still many EU member states have 
difficulties to comply with the prescriptions of the directive. Especially the use of animal 
manure is difficult to manage and can lead to nutrient losses in the environment (Schroder, 
2005; Schroder et al., 2004). Already lots of studies are dedicated to the manure problem  in an 
attempt to solve the problem of over fertilization but still member states appeal on the 
derogation possibility to moderate the effects of the implementation of the directive for the 
farmers.  
Member states are obliged to identify waters in which the concentration of nitrate in 
water is above, or at risk of reaching the 50 mg/l norm. Agricultural areas draining in these 
waters and which contribute to pollution should be designated as a nitrate vulnerable zones 
(NVZ) (Karaczun, 2005). In these regions member states are obliged to draw up (1) an action 
program, containing mandatory measures concerning the storage and application of manure and 
other organic and chemical fertilizers, and (2) a code for good agricultural practice, prescribing 
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the time and circumstances in which manure can be spread, the storage and spreading 
technologies to be used, and the fertilization standards for different crops (Goodchild, 1998). 
Within the nitrate directive most attention has been paid to the use of animal manure because 
this type of fertilizer is most difficult to manage. The impossibility to predict the exact nutrient 
availability and uptake is the reason why the precautionary fertilization standard for NVZ’s of 
170 kg manure-N ha-1 year -1 is imposed (Schroder, 2005). 
It is argued that this standard is to stringent for some crops , leading to an increased use of 
chemical fertilizers (Schroder et al., 2007a). Some crops can benefit from a higher manure 
application rate without necessarily causing a higher nitrate leaching: e.g. Schroder et al. 
(2007b) has found in the case of cut grassland in sandy soils, an application rate up to 340 kg 
manure N ha-1 year -1 would not lead to an excess of the 50 mg nitrate standard. A higher 
nutrient dose will be justified for crops with a long growing season and a high nutrient uptake 
(Ondersteijn et al., 2002). Therefore the European commission gave the possibility to deviate 
from this norm. A Member State may request the European Commission to deviate from this 
obligation under certain conditions (derogation). A dispensation is based on monitoring 
programs and experiments (Fraters et al., 2007). The derogation option is used by several 
governments (Flemish, Walloon, Dutch, Danish, German, Irish, North-Irish, Austrian and 
British government (VLM, 2009). Only the Austrian government did not prolonged the 
derogation option because of the limited success (VLM, 2009). 
In general,  in all regions where derogation is obtained, derogation is granted at farm 
level, except in Flanders. In these regions the decision whether a farm can apply for derogation 
or not is based on two criteria: the importance of cattle on the farm and the share of grassland in 
the total farm area. The criteria levels can differ between member states, even as the new 
imposed fertilization standard. These criteria levels differ for almost every member state 
resulting in 6 different derogation scenario’s. 
Until now, only few research is done with respect to the derogation option in the nitrate 
directive. Buysse et al. (2005) pointed the possibility that allowing derogation for a single or 
few crops would stimulate farmers to increase the cultivation of these crops. According to 
Kruitwagen et al. (2009) the economic effects of derogation are twofold. First, less mineral 
fertilizers should be used to reach the same fertilization level, leading to lower costs. Second, 
derogation provides costs savings for dairy farmers because less manure has to be disposed off 
the farm (usually at high costs). A positive side effect of derogation is the decline in national 
manure surplus because of the higher average manure rate on grassland (Kruitwagen et al., 
2009). On the other hand Claeys et al. (2008) has found that in the Flemish case the impact of 
derogation on manure surplus is limited, especially when phosphorus is considered to be the 
limited nutrient. 
In general, derogation is thus a cost saving policy measure. However,  the impact of 
derogation on the costs depends on the increase of the fertilization space, i.e. the joint impact of 
the fertilization standards under derogation and the number of hectares under derogation. The 
latest  is the result of two factors: the potential area under derogation and the willingness to 
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apply for derogation of the farmer. In this paper we analyze the individual and joint effect of the 
imposed derogation rules on both factors.  
Therefore the remaining of the paper is as follows: first the different set of derogation 
rules imposed in the different EU regions are described. In the following part a short description 
of the manure allocation model is given followed by a description of the data. In the result 
section first the potential effect of derogation for the different scenario’s is given, followed by 
an assessment of the derogation behaviour based on data for the Flemish region. This estimated 
behaviour is then used to assess the willingness to apply for derogation under each policy 
scenario. This outcome is then used to calculate the expected effect of applying each policy 
scenario.   
2. DEROGATION RULES WITHIN EUROPEAN UNION 
In Europe, 9 regions applied for derogation. In almost every region, a different policy 
regarding derogation is imposed. In general, 2 types of derogation can be distinguished. On the 
one side, a fertilization standard of 230 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1has been applied at farm level 
in the case that N-manure is at least 2/3 originating from cattle. On the other side, the new 
fertilization standard at farm level for N-manure is 250 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1 with the 
restriction that only farms cultivating grassland can apply for derogation. The minimum 
percentage of grassland varies between the different policies from 48 to 80%. 
The first two member states making use of the derogation option were Denmark (since 
2002) and Austria (since 2004). Farms with a minimum share of grassland of 70% and a 
minimum share of cattle manure of 66.7% can apply for derogation. The fertilization standard 
under derogation is 230 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1 imposed at farm level. In 2008 Austria did not 
prolonged the derogation option. Since 2006 The Netherlands are the third region where 
derogation can be applied. The derogation policy was less stringent: only the grassland criteria 
was imposed: farms with at least 70% grassland are able to apply for derogation. The new 
fertilization norm is 250 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1. In Germany derogation can be applied since 
2006 for farms where at least 2/3 of the total manure production originates from cattle. The new 
fertilization standard under derogation is 230 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1. In 2007 Wallonia, 
Ireland, North-Ireland and Flanders were the last four regions making use of the possibility to 
apply for derogation. North-Ireland and Ireland have both the same derogation policy. 
Derogation is applied at farm level where farms can obtain a new fertilization standard of 230 
kg manure-N ha-1 year-1 when more than 80% of the area is cultivated with grassland.   
The derogation policy in the two Belgian regions deviates from the general types applied 
in the other regions. In Wallonia, use is made of both derogation criteria (66.7% cattle manure 
and 48% grassland) but distinction is made between the fertilization standards for grassland 
(230 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1) and arable crops (115 kg manure-N ha-1 year-1). In Flanders the 
derogation policy is completely different from all others.  
The Flemish government succeed in obtaining a unique derogation regulation in two 
ways. First derogation is granted at parcel level instead of farm level and second, the 
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fertilization norm depends on crop type. In principle, all farmers with land in Flanders can apply 
for derogation. However, not all parcels are qualified to apply for derogation. The first 
restriction is the area in which the parcel is located. When the parcel lies in a phosphate 
saturated area, in a groundwater collection area or an area with a high nature value, the parcel is 
excluded from derogation. The crop is the second limiting factor. Only crops or crop sequences 
where the extra manure rate would not lead to an exceeding of the 50 mg nitrate norm are 
specified as derogation crops. The five groups are Grassland, Maize preceded with 1 cut of 
grass, sugar beets, fodder beets and wheat followed by a cover crop. The fertilization standards 
under derogation are 250 kg manure-N for grassland and grass + maize and 200 manure-N for 
the rest. The type of manure that can be applied on parcels under derogation is restricted as well. 
The tolerated manure types are cattle manure, manure from horses, cheeps and goats. Like in 
other countries, farmers have to fulfill several administrative tasks (keep up fertilization plan, 
fertilization register, analyzing soil and manure and following the code for agricultural 
practices). 
3. METHOD & DATA 
In this paper the impact of the differences in derogation policies on sector performance 
are analyzed. To be able to compare the different policies in the set of EU-regions, the policies 
are applied to a single case area, the Flemish region. For this region detailed information exist at 
farm level about the use and production of nutrients gathered by the Flemish land organization 
(in Dutch VLM). For each Flemish farm the crops grown and the corresponding fertilization 
standards are known at parcel level (depending on the nutrient, area and crop), the number of 
animals per animal type and the corresponding nutrient excretion standards, the use of each type 
of manure per farm and the quantity of transported and processed manure. The data includes 
information over farms involved with derogation and the number of hectares per farm under 
derogation. The dataset contains 38.777 farms for the year 2007.  Because of the availability of 
this detailed information, the Flemish area is the perfect case area to examine the differences in 
impact of the derogation policy options. 
In order to perform an impact analysis of the different derogation options, different steps 
have to be performed. The first step is to determine for each policy alternative which farms 
comply with the prescriptions and which farms will apply for derogation. In the second step, the 
valid fertilization standards are applied and the total farm fertilization space is determined. The 
third step is to run the manure allocation model (Van der Straeten et al., 2010) and to simulate 
the individual farm’ and total sector’costs. 
The manure allocation model is described in detail by Van der Straeten et al. (2010, 
2011). This multi-agent simulation model based on mathematical programming simulates 
farmer behaviour in a cost minimizing way. Each farmer has the choice to allocate his manure: 
disposing manure on his land, transporting it to other farms or process the manure. Manure 
spreading is limited because of the imposed fertilization standards. When a farmer cultivates the 
land, he has also the right to spread manure on it. This right is called a Nutrient Allocation Right 
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(NAR) and is exchangeable between farmers. Because NARs are scarce, these NARs have a 
value depending on the relation manure production – manure demand. In a region with a high 
manure surplus, NARs have a large value. The manure allocation model is able to simulate the 
regional differences in market price of NARs (Van der Straeten et al., 2011). 
To avoid an overflow of results, three key sector parameters are chosen to indicate the 
effect of the policy on sector performance: total costs, net costs and manure surplus. The total 
costs are defined as all costs a nutrient producer has to make to allocate his manure. This is the 
sum of the disposal, transport and processing costs and the costs for obtaining extra NARs. The 
net costs are the total costs adjusted with benefits generated from selling NARs to other farms. 
Because at aggregated level, benefits from trade outweigh the costs from trade, the aggregated 
net costs are all costs made from the sector, without taking the NAR-trade into account. The 
manure surplus is the sum of all positive farm surpluses, it is a measure for the total quantity of 
manure which cannot be put on own farmland.  
4. RESULTS 
The result section is structured as follows: first the maximum potential impact of different 
derogation scenario’s  are assessed, second the behaviour towards the application of derogation 
is described and estimated, third the expected impact is analysed, based on the estimated 
behaviour.  
4.1. Potential impact of derogation scenario’s  
Within the EU almost each member state applying for derogation, has imposed a different 
set of rules for derogation. Despite the importance of derogation for livestock farming sector, no 
comparison of the different set of rules has performed at this moment. In this result section 
importance of derogation is showed for the Flemish case. In the second part of the result section 
the impact of the different derogation rules valid in the EU on the total fertilization space. 
A first important indicator to highlight the effect of a derogation rule is the maximum 
extra fertilization space for nitrogen from animal sources. This indicator is calculated by 
applying derogation on all farms complying with the derogation prescriptions and by assuming 
derogation is applied on all land fitting the derogation rules within these farms. In other words, 
a 100% utilization of the derogation option is assumed. The differences in the derogation 
potential are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1: potential application rate of derogation with different derogation scenario’s, 
applied on Flemish case 
 Potential Number of 
farms 
Potential Acreage (ha) Extra fertilization space 
(million kg N_animal) 
Flanders 30845 476969 33.51 
The Netherlands 8828 70314 5.68 
Germany 17207 364137 23.46 
North-Ireland and Ireland 7103 44387 3.55 
Wallonia 9187 176609 3.64 
Austria/Denmark 4041 51216 3.11 
Source: own calculation 
 
As shown in Van der Straeten et al. (2010) differences in fertilization space lead to 
differences in costs of allocating the manure. First, by spreading more manure on farm land, the 
higher costs of manure processing can be avoided and thus total costs will be lower. Second, 
because more manure can be spread on own land, there will be less demand for NARs and thus 
a lower price per NAR must be paid. These effects are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: potential economic effects of derogation with different derogation scenario’s, 
applied on Flemish case 
 Total costs (million euro) Net costs (million euro) Manure surplus at farmlevel (kg N) 
 Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/kg)  
Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/kg) 
Total (kg 
N-manure) 
Number of 
surplus 
farms 
Average 
(kg 
N/surplus 
farm) 
No derogation 154.47 1.27 98.64 0.81 53.19 11 780 4 515 
Flanders* 79.78 0.66 62.13 0.51 41.34 8 184 4 747 
The Netherlands 140.08 1.15 89.86 0.74 51.53 10 854 4 926 
Germany 97.75 0.80 67.15 0.55 44.33 8 998 4 675 
North-Ireland and 
Ireland 
144.13 1.19 93.10 0.77 52.24 11 175 4 679 
Wallonia 142.05 1.17 92.39 0.76 51.78 11 001 4 720 
Austria/ 
Denmark 
143.13 1.18 94.65 0.78 51.97 11 008 5 051 
 
The differences in fertilization space lead to large differences in simulation results. In the 
Flemish scenario, with full compliance, the minimum costs to allocate all produced manure 
would be 79.78 million euro, this is a saving of 48.4% of the total costs. This is the scenario 
with minimal costs. At the other side, the Irish and North-Irish scenario is the less cost saving 
derogation scenario (only a saving of total costs of 6.7%). The effect of the net costs in more 
moderated. Savings in net costs varies between 4.0% in the Walloon case up to 37% in the 
Flemish case. Derogation offers farmers also the possibility to eliminate their manure surplus. 
Again the policy option will have a large influence on the number of farms: from only 605 in 
the Irish and North-Irish case up to 3 596 farms in the Flemish scenario.   
The difference in effect on total and net costs is the result of the effect of the costs made 
to obtain NARs from other farmers. Because of the decreased price of NARs, farmers have to 
pay less for NARs. This effect is however outweighed in the net costs because of the decreased 
benefits for the suppliers of NARs. 
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4.2. Derogation application behaviour 
However not all farms qualified for derogation will use this possibility. Because of 
different reasons farmers can choose to not apply for derogation or apply derogation on only a 
part of their potential area. This behaviour is important because this defines the possible effect 
of a derogation policy. In order to measure the effect a logit analysis is performed wherein the 
derogation behaviour (apply or not apply for derogation) is estimated based on farm and NAR-
market characteristics. The analysis is performed on a dataset of the Flemish land agency. All 
Flemish farms qualified for derogation are included (30845 farms in year 2007). Table 3 gives 
the results of this Logit analysis. 
 
Table 3: Estimation results of a logit estimation of the derogation application behaviour  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
constant -3.584867 0.085303 -42.02502 0.0000 
Total N production (kg N) 6.48E-05 5.73E-06 11.30510 0.0000 
Share of cattle manure (%) 0.008737 0.000377 23.16057 0.0000 
Share of manure from other animals (%) -0.002250 0.000638 -3.525400 0.0004 
N surplus in scenario without derogation (kg N) -9.95E-06 4.88E-06 -2.039846 0.0414 
NAR price (€ / kg N) 0.496942 0.025369 19.58861 0.0000 
Share of grassland and maize (%) 0.003542 0.000867 4.084179 0.0000 
Manure pressure * Potential increase in fertilization space 0.000328 1.29E-05 25.46664 0.0000 
Potential increase in fertilization space (%) 0.012705 0.001836 6.919178 0.0000 
     
     
Mean dependent var 0.360356     S.D. dependent var 0.480112 
S.E. of regression 0.405115     Akaike info criterion 1.009775 
Sum squared resid 4569.699     Schwarz criterion 1.012436 
Log likelihood -14053.63     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.010632 
Avg. log likelihood -0.504564   
Obs with Dep=0 17816      Total obs 27853 
Obs with Dep=1 10037   
     
 
All included independent variables have a significant effect in the 99.9% confidence 
interval except the manure surplus without derogation. The total nitrogen production on the 
farm has a positive influence on the probability  to apply for derogation. This probability 
increases when the share of nitrogen produced by cattle increases. The share of grassland and 
maize has also a positive effect on the probability of applying for derogation. Related to this, the 
percentage of which the total farm fertilization space can increase because of derogation has 
again a positive effect of the chance of applying for derogation. 
Farms situated in a region with a high average price for NARs have also a higher chance 
to participate even as farms with a higher nitrogen surplus. The last positive effect on the 
probability of participation goes out from the financial consequences of derogation. The chances 
to apply for derogation increases with increasing potential benefits or lower potential total costs. 
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The only variable with a significant negative influence on the probability is the nitrogen 
production from other animals  (horses, cheeps, goats and rabbits). 
The influence of the total nitrogen production on the probability is not significant while 
the importance of the animal group has a significant positive influence on this chance. The more 
the relative importance of cattle is, the higher the probability. For manure from other animals, 
the influence is the opposite. The influence of cattle is positive because on parcels under 
derogation only manure from grazing animals (cattle, cheeps, goats and horses) can be applied. 
Extremely stated, a specialized pig farm cannot dispose more of his manure on his land by 
applying derogation. Contrary, for such a farm, applying derogation will result in less own 
manure that can be spread on own land because all the NARs from that parcel must be used by 
using derogation manure (and thus not only the extra NARs). The influence of manure from 
other animals  is more difficult to predict in advance because this group of animals contains 
grazing animals (cheep, goat and horses) as non grazing animals (rabbits and minks). An 
explanation of negative relation can be found in the fact that cheep and goats and in less extent 
horses are able to graze during most of the year en thus all produced manure is disposed directly 
on the land. Because they are mainly fed by grazing, the growth of grass is the most determining 
factor for the number of animals per hectare of land. Through this, the 170 kg manure N norm 
will not be exceeded very often on parcels grazed by these animals. Moreover those animals 
demand grasslands with a rather low nitrogen content, meaning that derogation is often not 
desired.  
The possibility to apply for derogation is also positively influenced by the value of one 
NAR. This means that in regions with a high value of NARs, farmers are more encouraged to 
enlarge their available number of NARs. This behaviour has also been found by (Buysse et al., 
2007; Buysse et al., 2008): a higher quota rent leads to a higher use of the right. Moreover the 
influence of the manure pressure increases when the number of NARs can be enlarged in a 
larger extent, indicating the potential economic benefit from the increase in NARs. The farmer 
is thus influenced by the economic consequences of derogation. 
The latest factor, the extent in which the number of NARs can potentially be increased 
(%) has also a positive effect on the chance to apply for derogation. This can be explained from 
the transaction costs theory. The application for derogation generates transaction costs. For 
example, a number of administrative task must be fulfilled (fertilization  register, grazing 
register, …) , generating mainly fixed transaction costs, i.e. transaction cost which remain 
constant independent the extend of derogation. Therefore it is economically more interesting to 
spread the costs over more extra NARs. 
4.3. expected impact of derogation scenario’s based on estimated behaviour 
The influence on the chance to apply for derogation of each independent variables is 
analyzed for the Flemish case. Most variables are independent from the policy scenario except 
the potential increase in fertilization space. By changing the fertilization standard under 
derogation, the variable will change. The changed potential increase will affect the logit value 
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and the calculated probability to apply. Based on the probability it is determined which farms 
applying for derogation (all farms with a chance higher than 50% and complying to the 
derogation rules) (Table 4) and a new optimal manure allocation behaviour is simulated by 
means of the manure allocation model.  
 
Table 4: expected application rate of derogation with different derogation scenario’s, 
applied on Flemish case 
 Number of farms 
applying for 
derogation 
Area under 
derogation (ha) 
Extra fertilization 
space (million kg N) 
Flanders 5238 200641 14.73 
The Netherlands 678 21618 1.81 
Germany 4533 175143 11.59 
North-Ireland and Ireland 297 9706 0.82 
Wallonia 529 23980 0.74 
Austria/Denmark 513 17568 1.09 
 
Based on this procedure, 5 238 are assumed to apply for derogation when the Flemish 
policy is implemented. This is 17% of all farms qualified for derogation. The corresponding 
extra fertilization space is 14.73 million kg N, or an increase of 13.4% of the fertilization space 
without derogation. Applying all other derogation options, the number of farmers choose to 
apply for derogation are lower resulting in a lower area under derogation and a lower 
corresponding extra fertilization space. Similar as done when estimating the effect in the case of 
full compliance, the data of Table 4 are used in the manure allocation model in order to assess 
the economic effects. The results are given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: expected economic effects of derogation with different derogation scenario’s, 
applied on Flemish case 
 Total costs (million euro) Net costs (million euro) Manure surplus at farmlevel (kg N) 
 Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/kg)  
Total 
(million €) 
Average 
(€/kg) 
Total (kg 
N-manure) 
Number of 
surplus 
farms 
Average 
(kg 
N/surplus 
farm) 
No derogation 154.47 1.27 98.64 0.81 53.19 11 780 4 515 
Flanders* 108.80 0.89 75.08 0.62 45.58 10 127 4 500 
The Netherlands 144.76 1.19 95.96 0.79 52.27 11 549 4 525 
Germany 122.21 1.00 78.49 0.65 47.25 10 618 4 450 
North-Ireland and 
Ireland 
147.78 1.21 97.93 0.81 52.76 11 689 4 514 
Wallonia 147.76 1.21 97.94 0.81 52.67 11 706 4 500 
Austria/ 
Denmark 
146.33 1.20 97.23 0.80 52.54 11 628 4 518 
 
Similar to what is found in the case of full compliance, the different policy option 
generate large differences in costs when simulation is based on the estimated behaviour toward 
derogation. The savings in total cost varies between 4 and 30% and in net costs between 0.7 and 
23%. These are large differences in policy impact leading to the suggestion that a member state 
should consider all consequences well before choosing a policy scenario. 
Ancona - 122nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 10 of 12 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The derogation option offers the farm sector a possibility to mitigate the impact of 
becoming a nitrate vulnerable zone. Different EU member states applied for derogation but 
surprisingly the rules for derogation differ largely between member states. The imposed criteria 
to determine a farm can apply for derogation or not, the corresponding criteria levels, the new 
fertilization standards and the level of appliance (farm or parcel level) differs between the 
member states. In this paper the economic effects of the policy choices are examined.  
Next to the economic effects, the corresponding environmental effects of derogation are 
important as well. However, measuring these effects asks a detailed modelling of all possible 
factors influencing the nitrogen production, nitrogen use, nitrogen release from manure and 
nitrogen losses. This makes it very hard to simulate the environmental consequences of a policy 
regulating the manure use (Buysse et al., 2005; Rajsic and Weersink, 2008; Schroder, 2005). 
For that reason we have chosen to focus on the economic consequences.  
In Flanders 33% of all farms able to apply for derogation have applied derogation. In The 
Netherlands also 33% of the potential number of farms have applied for derogation but in all 
other regions the application rate is much lower, e.g. 3.9% in Denmark, 2.8% in North-Ireland, 
0.24% in Germany and only 0.005% in Austria (VLM, 2009). Related to other EU regions, the 
application rate of derogation in Flanders is very high. 
The success in Flanders is the result of the unique set of rules the Flemish government 
has obtained. That derogation can be applied at parcel level instead of farm level makes it 
possible that more farmers can apply for derogation. The high application rate in The 
Netherlands shows that not only the policy it selves is an important determinant of the 
application rate but also the extent in which the manure problem acts. In both The Netherlands 
and Flanders, the total region is indicated as a nitrate vulnerable zone and there is a manure 
surplus at sector level. The consequences of the manure policy are more experienced by farmers 
in these two regions than in other regions.  
Because of the imposed derogation criteria and the restriction that only manure of grazing 
cattle can be disposed on farmland under derogation, derogation will be mostly applied by cattle 
producers. In The Netherlands and Flanders, dairy production is very intensive in terms of kg 
milk production per hectare of land, meaning a high nutrient production per hectare. Therefore, 
in both regions at the one hand dairy farmers are strongly affected by the introduction of the 
nitrate vulnerable zone but on the other hand dairy farmers comply mostly to the derogation 
criteria and possess the right type of manure and thus have the key to reduce the impact in their 
own hands. 
In other regions, e.g. Germany and Denmark dairy production is less intensive in terms of 
production per hectare, meaning that dairy farmers have less problems to remain under the 170 
kg manure-N ha-1 year-1 standard. Farms complying with the imposed derogation criteria and 
farms having a manure surplus are therefore often not the same, resulting in a lower derogation 
application rate. 
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However the imposed policy rules seriously affect the potential success of derogation. 
The imposed policy has a large impact on the number of farms complying to the derogation 
criteria, the potential number of hectare under derogation or the extra obtained fertilization 
space. The latest has a significant impact on the allocation costs of manure.   
Whether a farmer applies for derogation or not is partly based on farm characteristics en 
market conditions wherein these farms operate. In general the probability to participate 
increases with an increasing importance of manure from cattle on the farm. The extent in which 
the fertilization space will increase because of derogation influence the chance of participate 
positively. Also the price of NARs in the region influence the chance to participate positively.  
For the entire farm sector derogation has a positive effect on the costs for manure 
allocation. For farms with a manure surplus, derogation leads to an increased quantity of 
manure that can be disposed on own land. Those farms can avoid transportation, processing and 
NAR acquisition costs by applying derogation. Non surplus farms can increase their available 
number of NARs and offering these at the NAR market. As a result, also other farms can 
dispose more manure on land. By doing that, they avoid processing costs but more transport 
costs and NARs must be bought. However, the result remains positive and thus derogation 
influence the entire sector positively.  
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